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ABSTRACT – Technological progress as a major source of economic development
stems from the interaction of two types of innovations, drastic and incremental. While
the former sets the fundamental pace of economic progress by redefining production
possibilities as Schumpeter strongly emphasized, the latter takes the basic framework as
given but pushes the production possibilities frontier outwards marginally in production
practice. This paper studies the dynamic interaction and effects of these endogenously-
determined innovations. Upstream firms in the model “produce” drastic innovation,
which turns out brand new technology and obsolesces the existing technology used by
downstream firms that specialize in final goods production. After the downstream firms
adopt the new technology, they can improve it further by their incremental innovations.
Economic development is shaped as successive Schumpeterian waves, where each wave
begins with a great leap forward in technology which is followed by a sequence of
adjustments. It is found that a rise in the success probability of future drastic
innovations will discourage current efforts at drastic innovation but stimulate
incremental innovations. More effort by downstream firms in incremental R&D reduces
upstream firms’ incentives for drastic R&D. The model ensures at least one dynamic
equilibrium. In the case of multiple equilibria, an equilibrium with larger investment in
drastic innovation has less expenditure on incremental innovation. The comparative
static analysis shows that a reduction in the expansiveness of drastic innovation, and an
increase in the total sales of downstream firms and in the significance of drastic
innovation will raise (reduce) drastic (incremental) R&D efforts in stationary
equilibrium.
KEYWORDS: Drastic and Incremental Innovations, Development, Schumpeterian
Dynamics.
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Interaction of Drastic and Incremental Innovations: Economic
Development through Schumpeterian Waves
…  to Professor Schumpeter, business cycles are
pulsations of the rate of economic evolution.
Simon Kuznets (1954)
1. Background
In his Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter (1934) presented the working of a
capitalistic economy as an evolutionary process, where the business cycle results from
the introduction and integration of innovations. The cycle is initiated, or triggered, by a
major innovation. The initial innovation (or cluster of such innovations) is then
followed by a massive diffusion of smaller innovations that exploit directly or indirectly
the profit potential “announced” by the initial radical change. These further adjustments
typically take place during the expansion of activity when uncertainty is reduced. When
the novelty is exhausted the economic system tends toward a new equilibrium position
with a higher level of welfare than the previous one. The industrial transformation that
takes place during the cycle encourages firms to use new forms of production
technologies, organizational structures, etc., and ill-adapted firms are eliminated.
Two important features of innovation-driven business cycles should be
underlined here.  The first is that economic fluctuations, or the business cycle, as
presented above, was understood by Schumpeter to be an analytical unit of reference, a
dynamic unit, (just as the equilibrium concept is a static reference point), rather than a
mechanical outcome of a parameter set as in some macroeconomic models. It is the
basic process by which the economy regenerates itself and reallocates resources in the
integration of new information. The second feature, closely related to the first, is that
the business cycle, expressing the transformation of production and markets, is in fact
shaped by the  interaction of two asymmetric and contradictory forces: creation or
development on the one hand and adjustment or allocation on the other. Both “creative
destruction”, where new firms, families and forms of life arise through the introduction3
of innovations while the older forms decline in the social-economic strata, and the more
gradual adaptation of economic structure (in Schumpeter’s terms, the “tendency towards
equilibrium”) should be regarded as an outcome of the basic interplay between
development and allocation processes.
While the original novelty is attributed to the action of the entrepreneur who is
obviously less risk adverse than other agents and is capable of anticipating the direction
of change, other firms that follow require less entrepreneurial capability. The diffusion
process that finally exhausts the profit opportunities created by the initial innovation
largely relies on the adjustment behavior of rational price-taking agents. Thus the
“representative agents” of these two facets of economic activities - the entrepreneur and
the manager, or alternatively the innovator and the imitator, are characterized by
different states of information and related uncertainty. They obey a different economic
rationale and operate with different global outcomes (positive and zero-sum games,
respectively) and the basic sense of norms and deviations (for example, the role of
market failures) is also very different.
Rosenberg (1976, 1982) expressed the composition of the two types of
innovation in several of his path-breaking works. Although he did not deny the
contribution of major innovation to economic development and growth, he claimed that
revolutionary innovation is in fact materialized through a sequence of gradual and
cumulative development steps. He presented a famous example of the car industry to
argue that, although the private automobile was certainly one of the great driving forces
of the industrialization in the early 20
th century, it was not really (economically) present
when few mechanical toys (the first automobiles) terrified horses in the countryside.
The revolution was only effective once Ford’s chain production reduced costs and
prices of car manufacture and made the automobile available to millions, gas stations
sprung up along the highways and the whole suburban lifestyle developed.
Nelson and Winter’s “technological trajectories” (1977) contributed to a better
understanding of the relation between successive innovations and the overall pattern of
the constitution and development of a new technology, which is in fact a continuous4
representation of a major innovation. Subsequent works by Sahal (1981), Dosi (1982),
Freeman et al. (1982), and  Zuscovitch (1986) presented conceptual frameworks in
which drastic innovations redefine the boundary of overall possibilities for economic
agents through a paradigm shift. Agents then perform “normal”  innovations which
improve productivity and develop and exhaust the potential of the novelty until the next
jump. Although these works undoubtedly offer an intellectually appealing framework
for the endogenizing of major innovations in the form of a process of technological
development, they remain within the sphere of what Nelson calls “appreciative theory”.
New growth theories have focused for more than a decade on the relationship
between technical change and growth. As is common in the neoclassical tradition, the
representation of innovation is basically restricted to a process of continuous
specialization via the division of labor in the Smithian tradition (Romer, 1986, 1990).
Grossman and Helpman (1991) added some qualitative features to the analysis of
innovation but essentially are guided by the framework of smooth growth without any
jumps and discontinuities that are an essential feature of the growth process.
The new-Schumpeterian approach formalizing several Schumpeter’s views of
growth and innovation recognizes the contribution of both drastic and incremental
innovations to economic growth and fluctuation. The work on creative destruction by
Aghion and Howitt (1992) introduced a strong depreciation effect of drastic innovation
on existing technology without, however, an analysis of the impact on subsequent
innovations. The models of general purpose technologies (Helpman and Trajtenberg,
1998; Aghion and Howitt, 1998, ch. 8) and swarming mechanism (Justman, 1996, 1997)
studied the growth and fluctuation caused by a sequence of incremental innovations
resulting from an  exogenously-determined drastic innovation.  Jovanovic and Rob
(1990), and Cheng and  Dinopoulos (1996)  endogenized both breakthroughs and
improvements. But in their models, the economy can have only one type of innovation
at any instant in time and improvements have no any effects on breakthroughs.
Moreover, the Cheng-Dinopoulos model relies on a parameter indexing the exogenously
accumulated basic research and scientific knowledge.5
In the present work we focus on the interaction and duality between drastic and
incremental innovations. The model represents the two features of innovation-driven
business cycles highlighted earlier. The first, due to its revolutionary nature, changes the
course of dynamics by defining a new framework for the productive system and
redefines the basis upon which economic agents compute their action plans. The second
is of an incremental and cumulative nature and each step is governed by computable
investment decisions according to the prevailing basic structure. The first type of
behavior is indeed historically more associated with Schumpeter where innovation
“pushes” economic activities. The behavior pattern of incremental innovation and
gradual development is more associated with  Smithian specialization through the
division of labor, and also with Schmookler’s (1966) “demand pull” hypothesis where
the innovative activities are attracted and oriented by the relative prices and more
general economic activities. However, neither the revolutionary nor the incremental
behavioral pattern is a consistent way to view the dynamics of innovation.
In order to grasp the forces that govern the interaction we treat drastic
innovations as the endogenous result of the investment of upstream firms. After a new
drastic innovation succeeds, each downstream firm devotes their efforts in a series of
incremental  innovations which can further increase their production efficiency and
make them more suitable to the new environment. Within this framework, a drastic
innovation opens new opportunities for incremental innovations on the one hand and
incremental innovations affect the profitability of next new drastic innovation and
upstream firms’ R&D decisions on the other hand. In a technical sense, our model
synthesizes and generalizes the case of creative destruction imposing obsolescence on
the productive structure à la Aghion and Howitt (1992) with subsequent adjustments as
suggested by the general purpose technologies approach (Helpman and  Trajtenberg,
1998; Aghion and Howitt, 1998, ch. 8).
In the rest of the paper, section 2 presents a basic model exploring the duality
between drastic and incremental innovations and illustrates how drastic innovations
surge Schumpeterian business cycles and how the economy grows wavily. The model6
shows that upstream firms reduce their efforts at drastic R&D but downstream firms
strengthen their efforts at incremental R&D if each expects the next drastic innovation
to arrive sooner. On the other hand, upstream firms have less incentive to do drastic
innovations if downstream firms invest more in incremental R&D. Section 3 proves that
the model ensures at least one stationary equilibrium. In the case of multiple equilibria,
an equilibrium with larger investment in drastic innovation has less expenditure on
incremental innovation. Comparative dynamics in section 3 shows that a reduction in
the expansiveness of drastic innovation, and an increase in the total sales of downstream
firms and in the significance of drastic innovation will raise (reduce) drastic
(incremental) R&D efforts in stationary equilibrium. The basic model is then extended
to account for learning by doing and the physical capital costs of drastic innovations.
2. A Basic Model
2.1 Technologies and Innovations
In an industry, technology and physical capital are provided by an upstream incumbent.
A drastic new innovation invented by an upstream firm completely obsolesces the
current production process and capital stock of  n downstream firms that engage in
monopolistic competition in the final goods market. Therefore, the drastic innovation
introduces a creative destruction, which redefines the production possibilities frontier as
argued by, amongst others, Dosi (1982) and Zuscovitch (1986). Time is continuous and
t t , indexing the moment the tth drastic technology is realized, is a random variable
since drastic innovations are uncertain. After the adoption of the drastically new
technology, each downstream firm can improve their technology efficiency by
successive incremental innovations of their own until the next drastic innovation arrives.
In the time interval  ) , [ 1 + ˛ t t t t t , downstream firm  i has a stepwise marginal cost
function
) ( ) ( t A t c i i G = t .      (1)
In the function,  t A , resulting from the drastic innovation, is universal to all downstream
firms, and technical progress achieved by drastic innovation entails its decline as  t7
increases.  ) (t i G   is determined by firm  i’s incremental R&D effort. Incremental
innovations are assumed to be deterministic and take a certain length of time to fully
materialize. This assumption depicts the notion discussed earlier that the adjustment
process requires less entrepreneurial capabilities and is more certain in contrast to
drastic innovation. To simplify notation, we assume that all incremental innovations
have the same time delay, equal to a single time period. Therefore  ) (t i G  evolves as
) 1 ( ) ( - G = G = G s i s i s i i t t t t g for  ) 1 , [ + + + ˛ s t s t t t t ,  s=1,2,…      (2)
1 0 = t i G ,
where  1 < s it g  is the contribution of the sth incremental innovation to cost reduction in
the tth Schumpeterian wave. Since incremental R&D is performed over a one-period
time lag, the R&D production is
) ( s i s s i y g t t t g = ,      (3)
where  s i y t  is firm i’s R&D investment flow in  ) , 1 [ s t s t + - + t t . The formula implies
that the productivity of the investment in incremental R&D might vary over different
periods but it is identical across all downstream firms. A reasonable assumption about
R&D production is that it has positive marginal returns but the gain is limited, i.e.,
s s g t t g = ¥) ( . Since the innovation is incremental,  s t g  is much smaller than  1 - t t A A .
This specification of technology illustrates that technological progress is in the
form of a big leap forward, initiating a Schumpeterian wave, followed by a series of
small steps of efficiency improvements. Another drastic innovation yields a new
Schumpeterian wave. It captures part of Rosenberg’s discussion (1976) of the
relationship between the “announce effect” of the major innovation and the subsequent
adjustments. Although the model shares some characteristics with the works by Aghion
and Howitt (1992) and the models of  general purpose technologies (Helpman and
Trajtenberg, 1998;  Aghion and  Howitt, 1998,  ch. 8), it goes beyond them. In the
Aghion-Howitt model, downstream firms do not do any research and technological
progress is generated solely by the breakthroughs of upstream firms. The  general
purpose technologies models presume drastic innovation are exogeneously given and
incremental innovations have no impacts on them. In this sense, the present model8
extends their discussions to a more general setting. Furthermore, if  s it g  is achieved by
learning-by-doing (LBD) instead of by incremental innovation, the model resembles the
works of Young (1993) and Stern (1997) where the LBD process, after each innovation,
can further improve production efficiency. LBD is discussed in the final section.
Drastic innovations have two implications in the model. The first is that it is not
firm-specific; that is, if a new drastic innovation succeeds and is adopted by
downstream firms, all these firms have the same technological improvement. The
second is creative destruction, in the sense that if a new drastic innovation is
materialized, not only does it make previous technology and physical capital obsolete,
but it also renders previous incremental innovation meaningless. This latter
characteristic is reflected in the non-accumulation of  ) (t i G  across Schumpeterian
waves, i.e., after each drastic innovation  ) (t i G  starts from  1 0 = G t i . In contrast, the
effects of incremental innovation on efficiency are cumulative so that  ) (t i G
continuously declines in a stepwise manner within one Schumpeterian wave. The
cumulative effects exist until a new generation of technology replaces the old. In fact,
much literature in the economics of innovation distinguishes between drastic and
incremental innovations on the basis of the accumulation or otherwise of innovation
effects. By comparison, Katz and Shapiro (1987) argued that a minor innovation
marginally reduces each firm’s cost by the same amount and is irrelevant to their
existing technology difference but a major innovation sweeps off existing difference
and leads to the same post-innovation production cost. Moreover, incremental
innovation could be made firm-specific in the model and therefore imitating other firms’
outcomes of incremental R&D could cost time and money. In order to keep the model
simple, however, we assume that each downstream firm can only keep their incremental9
innovation secret for one period and after that period rival firms can costlessly imitate
the innovation without any further time delay.
1
2.2 Decisions of Downstream Firms
Within each Schumpeterian wave, market equilibrium is determined by a Stackelberg-
like process, where all upstream firms are leaders announcing their investment in drastic
innovation first while all downstream firms are followers who take the upstream firms’
R&D expenditures as given in their decisions.
2 Downstream firms make two decisions:
price/output and investment in incremental innovations. The demand for each output is
assumed to have a constant elasticity of substitution,  ) 1 ( 1 q - , i.e.,
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) (
- - =
q q q t P t Ip t q i i ,      (4)
where I is a constant determined by aggregate demand and the number of downstream






















t P .      (5)
Assuming the number of downstream firms is large enough so that price competition
leads to a constant markup  q 1  and the equilibrium price is equal to
q ) ( ) ( t c t p i i = ,      (6)
given the profile of marginal costs  ) (t ci  (i=1,2,…n). Since marginal costs decline
stepwise as technology is improved, so do prices.
The investment in incremental innovation is determined by the gains it
generates. Since an innovative firm can maintain its efficiency superiority for one
                                               
1 This simplification is in contrast to Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) who argue that technology is not
completely transferable. Therefore, a firm cannot apply another firm’s innovations without its own R&D
efforts. In that case we should introduce imitation cost and time delay.
2 However, the competition among upstream and downstream firms differs from the standard Stackelberg
model.10
period, downstream firm i needs only to consider the profit reward from incremental
innovation in this period. It receives the profit flow (gross of R&D investment)
[ ]
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
- - - =
q q q q q q p t c t IP t i i      (7)
in period  ) 1 , [ + + + s t s t t t  and incurs a cost flow  s i y t  in period  ) , 1 [ s t s t + - + t t . As
the probability that the next (the (t+1)th) drastic innovation will not succeed until t is
)} ( exp{ 1 t t l t t H - - + ,
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where r is the interest rate. By ignoring the effect of a firm’s marginal cost on the price
index, symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the first-order condition
4
1 ) ( )} ( exp{ ) ( ' ) 1 ( 1 £ + - - - + s s s s y g H r y g I t t t t t l q ,
0 ‡ s yt with at least one equality. s=1, 2, …      (9)
The condition implies that the expected marginal return of incremental innovation must
be equal to its expected cost in the case of positive investment. A standard assumption
on the investment in incremental innovation is diminishing returns so that  ) ( ' ￿ s g t  is a
monotonically increasing function and  0 ) ( ' = +¥ s g t . This assumption ensures an
interior equilibrium if it exists.
As is obvious from the first-order condition, downstream firms’ investment in
incremental innovation declines if upstream firms invest more in drastic innovation. The
reason is simple. When upstream firms spend more money on the new generation of
technology, the hazard rate is larger, i.e., it will succeed sooner. Since it will obsolesce
current technology and efficiency efforts completely, the expected return from
incremental innovation based on the current generation of technology is lower. This
discourages downstream firms’ involvement in incremental innovation. If, for example,
biotechnological breakthroughs appear at a faster rate (Grabowski, 1998), this obviously
                                               
3 Hazard rate  1 + t H  is constant in these periods and positively relates to upstream firms’ investment in the
(t+1)th drastic innovation. We will show how to obtain the probability in detail below.
4 A variable without subscript i indicates its symmetric counterpart.11
reduces the investments of pharmaceutical firms in gradual improvements in chemical-
based medicines.
The model also shows that investment expenditures on incremental innovation
for different periods are independent. This is a special property stemming jointly from
the symmetry and the coincidence of the length of time-delay for an incremental R&D
with the duration of its appropriation. This property ensures that expenditure on
incremental innovation in each period is equal if the R&D production functions,  ) (￿ s gt ,
are identical across periods. However, a more realistic assumption is that  ) (￿ s gt  declines
as  s increases which implies that efficiency improvement potential is gradually
exhausted.
2.3 Decisions of Upstream Firms
The success of drastic innovation is assumed to be uncertain so that when a firm wins
the race of drastic innovation competition, i.e., becomes the first inventor, it
monopolizes the new technology until the technology is phased out by another newer
drastic innovation.
5 The monopolist charges the same  lump-sum license fee to all
downstream firms for access to the new technology. Then the question is what license
fee will each downstream firm be willing to pay for the tth radical innovation? It is
clear that they are willing to pay up to the difference of two expected profit streams: the
profit of adopting the  tth drastic innovation from  t t  onwards without any further
incremental innovation, and the profit of using the existing technology at time  t t
without further incremental innovation. This profit difference reflects the net gain of a
downstream firm achieved by giving up the current production method and adopting a
radically new one. In the profit difference, gains from incremental innovation should be
excluded because they are the contribution of a downstream firm’s own R&D efforts.
From (1) and (2), the marginal cost achieved by the tth drastic innovation is  t A .
But if a firm still uses the old generation of technology updated until time  t t , it has a
                                               
5 This can be thought of as a permanent patent race for a drastic innovation.12
marginal cost  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 - - - - G ” t t t t T A c , where  ) 1 ( - t T  is the largest integer of ( 1 - - t t t t ).
Therefore, if  k downstream firms adopt the  tth generation of technology while the
remaining firms continue to use the old technology, the profit flow from adopting the
new technology is given by:
6
( ) ( ) { }
) 1 (
1
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With  k licenses allowing access to the  tth generation of technology, an upstream
monopolist can receive total license fees equal to the flow  ) , ( t k klt . To maximize the
total license fees, it chooses k by solving
) , ( max t k klt ,    (11)
which gives the optimum  k=n. This means that the monopolist always grants all
downstream firms a license. The total license fees it can reap  is
( ) [ ]
) 1 (
1 1 ) 1 ( ) , (
-
- - - =
q q
t t t q A c I n t n nl .
Since drastic innovation is uncertain, the time of upstream firm j successfully
realizing the tth drastic innovation,  ) , ( 1 ¥ ˛ - t t t t j , is a continuously-distributed random
variable. Following Lee and Wilde (1980) and Reinganum (1983), if firm j invests a
capital flow  t j z  in the R&D project, starting from time  1 - t t , the probability that the firm
will succeed in implementing the innovation at or before  t t  is assumed to be
{ } { } ) )( ( exp 1 Pr 1 1 1 - - - - - - = - £ - t t t t t t t t l t t z h t t t t j j .     1 - > t t t t    (12)
Drastic innovation also has positive but diminishing returns, i.e.,  0 ) ( ' > ￿ h  and  0 ) ( " < ￿ h .
Furthermore, it is assumed that  0 ) ( ' lim ) 0 ( = = ¥ ﬁ z h h z . For such an exponential
distribution, the probability that no upstream firm will succeed until  t t  but firm  j
succeeds in the next instant  t dt  is  { } ) ( exp ) ( 1 - - - t t t t t l t t H z h j , where
￿ = =
m
j j z h H
1 ) ( t t t    (13)
                                               
6 This simple expression depends on monopolistic competition so that  ) , 1 ( ) , ( t k P t k P + @ . For an
oligopoly, the profit difference is more complex due to an integer problem (see Kamien and Tauman,
1986).13
is the sum of hazard rates. Because each downstream firm is willing to pay a license fee
flow  ) , ( t n lt  from  t t  to  1 + t t , the upstream monopolist’s expected license revenue from
the tth drastic innovation is
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It should be noted that  t L  is a decreasing function of  t t  because  1 - t c  declines stepwise
as  t t  increases. The intuition is clear. If the winning upstream firm succeeds in its
search for the tth drastic innovation later, it should expect smaller license fees since the
delay leads to a smaller gap of marginal costs between old and new technologies. To
ensure the model is tractable, we make an approximation on  t L . Let  t * t  be the
expected time of the tth drastic innovation succeeding. When upstream firms make their
investment decisions at time  1 - t t , they expect downstream firms to have a marginal cost
) 1 ( * ) 1 ( 1 1 * - - - - G = t t t t T A c , where  ) 1 ( * - t T  is the largest integer of ( 1 * - - t t t t ). In other
words, they use  1 * - t c  to approximate  1 - t c  in (14) to calculate license revenue. This
approximation implies that upstream firms are indifferent to marginal variations in
downstream firms’ marginal costs due to the timing of drastic innovation success and
the consequent variations in license revenue. What they are concerned with is how to
win the drastic R&D race. Therefore, upstream firm j chooses investment strategy  t j z
to maximize
7
    ( ) [ ] ( )( ) { } ( ) [ ] ( ) t t t t t t t t t t t t t l l l l
t
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When all upstream firms have a common prediction of  1 + t H , the first-order condition,
characterizing symmetric equilibrium  t z , is:
[ ][ ] [ ] 0 ) ( ' ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ' 1 £ - - + - - + + t t t t t t t t t t t t l l l l z h z z h r z h m H r z V z h
0 ‡ t z with at least one equality, t=1, 2, …    (16)
where
( ) [ ]
) 1 (
1 * 1 ) 1 ( ) (
-
- - - ”
q q
t t t t q A c I n z V    (17)
                                               
7 In this setting, physical capital costs are implicitly included in the costs of drastic innovation. We
discuss the case where physical costs occur after innovation success in the final section.14
is the profit stream of downstream firms, obtainable by adopting a new drastic
technology.
2.4 Equilibrium
Given  1 + t H , which is determined by the investment of upstream firms in the  tth
Schumpeterian wave, condition (16) provides their equilibrium investment in the tth
drastic innovation,  t z ,
8 taking the reaction of downstream firms (9) into account. Since
) ( t t z mh H = , downstream firms know the probability distribution of the tth drastic
innovation succeeding since  t z  is known. They therefore choose their incremental R&D
investment in the (t-1)th Schumpeterian wave according to (9).
9 Equilibrium price and
output in the goods market are determined by (1), (4) and (6).
Economic dynamics is thus characterized by a sequence of waves initiated by
technology jumps of drastic innovations with substantial reallocation of resources and
reorganization of markets. These waves represent real stages in economic development
as Schumpeter (1939) and Kuznets (1954) emphasized. Within each wave a series of
progressive efficiency improvements mildly change resource allocation at each
adjusting step, marginally push the production frontier outward and moderately adjust
production and markets in a cumulative manner. In this sense, the model consolidates
Schumpeter’s analytical construction of innovation-triggered business cycles.
Proposition 1. Given  1 + t H , there exist equilibrium investment decisions  { } s yt  (s=1,
2,…) and  t z  that satisfy (9) and (16).
For the proof, see the appendix.
An obvious characteristic of the model is that decisions of up- and downstream
firms in each wave are interactive in conjunction with the expectation of the next drastic
                                               
8  t z  is decided at the beginning of the (t-1)th Schumpeterian wave and maintained during that wave.
9 (9) is deduced for the tth wave. When it is applied to the (t-1) wave, the subscripts in (9) should be
adjusted accordingly.15
innovation. If upstream firms expect that the (t+1)th drastic innovation will succeed
sooner due to higher investment, i.e.,  1 + t H  is larger, they will reduce their R&D
expenditures on the current drastic innovation (the tth innovation). The reason is that if
the (t+1)th drastic innovation comes sooner, downstream firms will be willing to pay a
smaller license fee for the tth drastic innovation since it may last a shorter period (see
Figure 1 for the time structure). This is clear from (17) since for the same stream of
profit difference  t V , a larger  1 + t H  implies a smaller license fee  t L . With a smaller
license fee, upstream firms have less incentive to win the race of the  tth drastic
innovation as indicated by (15) so that they will invest less in the tth drastic innovation
as required by (16).
10
FIGURE 1 IS ABOUT HERE
So far, only the first round effects have been accounted for. When upstream
firms reduce their investment in the tth drastic innovation, the downstream firms will
expect that the t-generation technology will arrive later so their incentive to engage in
incremental innovation based on the (t-1)-generation technology increases. According
to (9), they will increase their investment series  s y ) 1 ( - t . Thus  1 * - t c  will be reduced as
downstream firms realize a greater efficiency improvement and  t V  will decline.
11 A
smaller  t V  will naturally prevent upstream firms from investing further in the  tth
drastic innovation. From this analysis, we can draw the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If all firms expect an increase in the probability of success of the
(t+1)th drastic innovation, upstream firms will reduce their R&D investment in the tth
drastic innovation but downstream firms will increase their incremental innovation
activities to improve the efficiency in the (t-1)th Schumpeterian wave. Moreover, an
increase in incremental innovation expenditure by downstream firms in the (t-1)th wave
will reduce upstream firms’ incentive for the tth drastic innovation further.
                                               
10 Holding  t V  constant, the equality of (16) implicitly defines  t z  as a decreasing function of  1 + t H .
11 Another effect that reduces  t V  is the longer expected time of the tth drastic innovation to succeed.16
The proposition vividly illustrates the duality between drastic and incremental
innovations. On the one hand, a drastic innovation provides a new platform to perform
incremental innovations. If managers of downstream firms think that this new platform
will come soon they prefer to save resources now and to work on the new platform once
it arrives. On the other hand, a more efficient exiting technology is more difficult to
abandon. Today’s efficiency could be an obstacle to tomorrow’s breakthrough in
development. Rosenberg (1976), for instance, describes how the steam ships have
stimulated a last wave of perfection design of the clippers. The play of overlapping
technological generation is a fascinating issue per se, and substitution and
complementary relations need to be better explored.
3. Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, we focus on stationary equilibrium, where the investment series  } { s yt
and  } { t z  are wave-invariant such that  s s y y ) 1 ( + = t t  and  1 + = t t z z .
12 Thus the R&D
investment profits across Schumpeterian waves are identical. To ensure the existence of
stationary equilibrium, we assume that each drastic innovation results in the same
radical jump in technology, i.e.,
1 1 A a aA A
t
t t = = - ,     (18)
and that the R&D productivity of incremental innovation based upon each drastic
innovation is identical, i.e.,  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ￿ = ￿ = ￿ - s s s g g g t t . To simplify the notation, it is
further assumed that there exists an integer S such that  ) ( ) ( ￿ = ￿ g gs  (with  -¥ = ) 0 ( ' g )
for all  S s £  and  0 ) ( ” ￿ s g  when  S s > ; that is, in the first S periods, downstream firms
have the same production function for incremental R&D but after that they cannot
improve efficiency at all. In reality, we might observe that right after a drastically new
technology has been introduced efficiency improvements are relatively easy to make.
Then the efficiency potential of the new generation technology is gradually exhausted
and efficiency improvement is more and more difficult until it becomes economically
                                               
12 A variable without subscript t and/or s is wave- and/or period-invariant.17
infeasible.
13 Our simplification is an approximation of this process with a switch off in
period S.
Noting the assumptions on the production function of incremental innovation,
) (￿ g ,
14 the stationary equilibrium  y>0 for any given  ) (z mh H =  is uniquely
characterized by
1 ) ( )} ( exp{ ) ( ' ) 1 ( = + - - - y g H r y g I l q    (9a)
for each period  S s £ . In these periods, each downstream firm has an efficiency
improvement  ) (y g = g . Since  ) ( ) ( ' ￿ ￿ - g g  is a decreasing function,  y declines as H
increases. But when  S s > , y=0 so that goods production has no efficiency update.
Turning to drastic innovation, the first-order condition (16) can be rewritten as
[ ] [ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( )] ( [ z V r z h m z h r z h z z h m z mh r = + - + - + l l l l l ,  (16a)
where
[ ] ( ) [ ]
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In (17a),  [ ] H l
1  indexes the largest integer of 1/lH, which is the expected time for a
drastic innovation to succeed or the expected life of a generation of technology.
Variable z affects V(z) in two ways. First, an increase in z reduces the expected life 1/lH
since  ) (z mh H = . When  [ ] S H £ l
1 , the increase results in a larger  V if  g  remains
constant. The intuition is that for a shorter expected life of drastic innovations,
downstream firms have less frequent opportunities to improve efficiency. Consequently,
at the time that a drastically new technology is introduced, the gap between old and new
technology is larger. Second, because  ) (y g = g  and y is a decreasing function of z
                                               
13 In his recent contribution, Weitzman (1997) provides an interesting explanation for this process of
potential exhaustion by pointing out that the new principle innovation is crossed with existing technical
objects.
14 They are:  0 ) 0 ( = g ,  g = +¥) ( g ,  -¥ = ) 0 ( ' g ,  0 ) ( ' = +¥ g ,  0 ) ( ' < ￿ g  and  0 ) ( " > ￿ g . An example of
such a function is  g g + - =
-
} exp{ ) 1 ( ) (
2
1
y y g .18
determined by (9a), an increase in  z discourages the downstream firms’ efforts at
incremental innovation, and in turn increases g  and V.
Denoting the left-hand side of (16a) as W(z), it is easy to show that W(z) is a
continuously increasing function with  0 ) 0 ( £ W  and  +¥ = +¥ ﬁ ) ( lim z W z . On the other
hand, (17a) shows that V(z) is a piece-continuous increasing function with
( ) [ ] 0 1 ) 1 ( ) ( min
) 1 (
0 min > - - = ”
- q q
g q a I n z V V
S ,
( ) 0 1 ) 1 ( ) ( max
) 1 (
max > - - = ”
-q q q a I n z V V ,
where  ) ( 0 0 y g = g  and  0 y  is the solution of (9a) for H=0. Let  s z  be implicitly defined
as  s z mh s = ) ( l  for s=1, 2, …, S. Figure 2 graphically illustrates V(z) and W(z).
FIGURE 2 IS ABOUT HERE
Proposition 3. The industry has at least one stationary equilibrium. In the case of
multiple equilibria, an equilibrium with larger investment in drastic innovation has less
expenditure on incremental innovation, and vice versa.
Proof: Noting that W(z) is a monotonic increasing function, the proof is similar to
proposition 1 and we omit it here.
The dynamic time path of production costs, prices and outputs of downstream
firms consists of a series of big random jumps and a number of small non-random steps
between any two adjacent jumps. More specifically, assume that the industry is
established by the first drastic innovation and define  0 1 = t . Then c(t), p(t) and q(t) start
from  1 ) 0 ( A c = ,  q 1 ) 0 ( A p =  and  q 1 ) 0 ( IA q =  according to (1)-(2) and (4)-(6). Before
the next drastic innovation arrives, c(t), p(t) and q(t) are constant except for steps at
t=1,2,…,S. The size of each step in percentage terms (i.e.,  c c D , etc.) is  ) (y g = g ,
where  y is the solution of (9a) and (16a). The arrival time  2 t  of the next drastic
innovation is stochastic, with probability distribution function
{ } { } ) )( ( exp 1 Pr 1 2 2 2 t t z mh t t - - - = £ l . At time  2 t  a new drastic innovation succeeds
and initiates a new Schumpeterian wave. Previous technology becomes obsolete and
each downstream firm with marginal cost  1 2) ( aA t c =  sets a new price  q 1 2) ( aA t p =  to
produce an output of  q 1 2) ( IA a t q =  at the beginning of the second wave. After that,19
their cost, price and output evolve in stepwise-increase or -decrease as in the first wave.
The economy grows through a cyclical process infinitely.
An interesting outcome of the model is that although agents in stationary
equilibrium take the same decisions, all upstream firms spend a constant amount z on
drastic innovations and all downstream firms invest y in incremental R&D, the economy
still fluctuates. The Schumpeterian business cycle is rooted in the economy and without
fluctuations it cannot grow. This growth pattern obviously differs from the marginal
evolution of growth models by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and
Young (1993). In its spirit our Schumpeterian model is closer to Aghion and Howitt
(1992), Justman (1997), and Stein (1997) in emphasizing the discontinuity of economic
growth. However, it goes further by integrating into the business cycle through the
interaction of the up-steam and downstream agents, part of the dynamics of
development and allocation processes.
We turn now to study the effects of parameters of the model on stationary
equilibrium. To simplify the discussion, we presume the equilibrium of (9a) and (16a) is
unique or that the equilibrium does not jump from one dynamic locus to another when a
parameter of the model has a marginal variation. Since y is inversely related to z, the
following analysis focuses on z.
Consider l first. A larger l means that a drastic innovation is less expensive in
the sense that it has a greater probability to be invented given the same amount of
investment. It is easy to see that  0 ) ( < ¶ ¶ l z W  so that an increase in l shifts W(z) in
Figure 2 downwards. On the other hand, (9a) shows that an increase in l reduces y
when H is invariant and in turn raises g by (3). This effect, together with the shorter
expected life of a drastic innovation,  H l 1 , shifts V(z) upwards. Thus, the intersection
of W(z) and V(z) yields a larger equilibrium z. Intuitively, an increase in l has three
effects. First, it shifts the marginal revenue curve of drastic innovation upward and the20
marginal cost curve downward given that the license fee is invariant,
15 resulting in
higher investment by upstream firms. Second, a large l implies that the next drastic
innovation will arrive sooner and that downstream firms have less incentive to improve
efficiency so that V is larger, which also stimulates upstream firms’ investment. Third,
when the next drastic innovation arrives sooner, the expected life of a drastic innovation
is shorter, a winning upstream firm can therefore reap a smaller license fee L from the
same V, which discourages investment in drastic innovation. The third effect is offset by
the second leading the net effect to be second-order small in comparison with the first
effect. Thus, a larger l unambiguously yields more investment in drastic innovation.
From (18), a smaller  a represents more significant of a drastic innovation.
Accordingly, it is more attractive to upstream firms. But it has no direct impact on the
behavior of downstream firms although it indirectly reduces their interests in
incremental innovations through upstream firms’ expenditure increase on drastic
innovations. This can be shown by the upward shift of V(t) and the unchanged W(t) as a
declines in Figure 2.
In a one-shot game of an uncertain R&D race to win a fixed technology reward,
Lee and Wilde (1980) and Yin and Zuscovitch (1995) claim that the number of firms in
the industry can stimulate each competitor’s R&D investment. These models are quite
similar to our model if it is simplified to have only upstream firms and these firms only
meet once in the game. But these two conditions prevent us from reaching unambiguous
conclusions on the R&D stimulation of upstream firms. The reason is that an increase in
m shifts both the marginal revenue and the marginal cost curves of drastic innovations
upward when the license fee,  L, is fixed.
16 Moreover, a larger  m implies a shorter
expected life of drastic innovations with given z and induces two contradictory effects
on L. On the one hand, it makes each downstream firm invest less, leading to a larger V
                                               
15 To see this, take the partial derivatives of (15) with respect to  t j z  keeping  t L  constant, and then set all
t j z  equal to z.
16 For a proof, see footnote 15.21
and  L. On the other hand, the monopoly power of an upstream incumbent can be
maintained for a shorter period of time and it therefore receives a lower L. In Figure 2,
the ambiguity is depicted by the upward shifts of both V(z) and W(z) curves.
17
In the model the effects of  n, the number of downstream firms, is also
unambiguous, depending on the sales of each downstream firm. Clearly,  W(z) is
independent of n. From (4) we can see that I is equal to the sales of each downstream
firm. If consumer expenditure on the output of this industry is constant, which would be
the case if, for instance, the utility function for composite goods of this industry and the
remaining economy is Cobb-Douglas, then  I is proportional to the inverse of  n.
Generally, I can decline more or less than proportionately with the inverse of n as n
increases. Thus V(z) may shift upward, remain unchanged or shift downward as more
firms enter the downstream sector, depending on whether nI rises, remains constant or
falls. Consequently, the expenditures on drastic innovation  is higher, unchanged, or
lower, respectively.
Because  ) 1 ( 1 q -  is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods, a
larger  q corresponds to a situation where the goods in the economy are more
homogeneous. Although q has no direct effect on W(z), its effect on V(z) is ambiguous.
The reason is that a larger q implies a more competitive market. It reduces the profit
stream from using old as well as new generation technology.
The parameter  S in the model is determined by the property of drastic and
incremental innovations. On the one hand, a larger  S may be the result of a more
revolutionary drastic innovation since it promises a greater potential for subsequent
incremental innovation. On the other hand, a large S can also result from the relative
insignificance of each round of incremental innovation. Consider now an increase in S
from an initial level S* to S*+1. This increase breaks the first segment of the initial V(z)
curve into two segments and leaves others unchanged. Moreover, the first segment of
the new V(z) is on (0, 1 *+ S z ) and is below the old curve and the second segment is on
                                               
17 Positive partial derivatives of V(z) and W(z) with respect to m can prove this.22
( 1 *+ S z , * S z ) and overlaps the old curve. Hence, only when the initial intersection of V(z)
and W(z) falls in (0,  1 *+ S z ), will an increase in S by one reduce z. Intuitively, if the initial
z is more than  1 *+ S z , the expected life of a drastic innovation is shorter than S*+1. In this
case, downstream firms cannot, on average, exploit all the opportunities for incremental
innovations within  S periods.
18 Providing more opportunities for incremental
innovations does not alter the expected license revenue obtainable by an upstream
monopoly. But, if the initial  z is less than  1 *+ S z , an extra round of incremental
innovation can reduce the technology gap between current technology and the
drastically new technology at the time the new drastic innovation is introduced. Hence,
V is reduced and so is the expected license fee, and upstream firms will tend to cut their
expenditures on drastic innovation.
Finally, W(t) shifts upward when r rises since  0 ) ( > ¶ ¶ r z W . On the other hand,
(9a) illustrates that the greater is r, the smaller is y, and consequently the larger is g.
Thus an increase in r also shifts V(t) upward. This leads to ambiguous effects of r on the
equilibrium.
The findings of this comparative dynamics can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4. Stationary investment in drastic innovation z increases but investment
in incremental innovation y decreases if l or nI increases or a decreases. An increase in
S reduces z and raises y if  1 + < S z z  and yields no effect otherwise. But the effects of m, q
and r on y and z are ambiguous.
4. Extensions of the Basic Model
4.1 Physical Capital Costs
Although the innovation may come in the form of intangible assets and blueprints, its
transformation into a new production technology usually requires new physical capital
such as new machine tools. A drastic innovation should phase out original physical
capital and replace it with new machines embodying the new technology. This matches
                                               
18 Note, incremental innovation has a one-period time delay.23
very well with Schumpeter’s perception of innovation as a “New Combination”. The
invention may be immaterial but the economics of innovation is driven by the need to
adapt production and to reallocate resources from the previous use to the new and more
productive one. In the basic model, we did not clearly distinguish between the costs of
inventing a drastic new technology and the costs of producing the related physical
capital. To deal with this, we can think of the R&D expenditure flow z in the basic
model as the one required to invent the new technology. In order to develop the physical
capital once the innovation succeeds, the monopolist has to pay a fixed amount  t F  and
then sell the physical capital to downstream firms in conjunction with charging a license
fee. In this case, the license fee plus the capital cost equals the sum of the expected
profit stream each downstream firm can obtain by adopting a new generation of
technology. Hence, the monopolist’s gain from a drastic innovation is
t t t t l nF H r z V L - + = + ) ( ) (
~
1  instead of  t L . The equilibrium conditions are (9) and
[ ] { }[ ] [ ] 0 ) ( ' ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ' 1 £ - - + - - - + + t t t t t t t t t t t t t l l l l z h z z h r z h m nF H r z V z h
0 ‡ t z with at least one equality. t=1, 2, …  (16b)
Thus the introduction of capital costs only reduces the rewards of the winner of drastic
innovation by a fixed amount of capital costs and the mechanisms of the interaction
between two types of innovations remain the same. Propositions 1 and 2 are still valid.
Referring to stationary equilibrium, we must assume that the capital costs for
each drastic innovation are the same, i.e.,  F F = t . Equilibrium is characterized by (9a)
and
WF(z)=V(z),   (16c)
where V(z) is still defined by (17a) but
[ ] [ ] { } nF r z h m z h r z h z z h m z mh r z WF + + - + - + = ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( )] ( [ ) ( l l l l l . (18)
Since WF(z) has the property that  0 ) 0 ( £ WF  and  +¥ = +¥ ﬁ ) ( lim z WF z , proposition 3
still holds after the introduction of fixed costs. Comparing WF(z) with W(z), we have
19
                                               
19 To simplify the notation, the variable z has been dropped. Subscripts here index partial derivatives.24
l l W mnhF WF + = ,    0 0 ) ( = > > + = m n W F mh r WF l ,    0 > + = m m W nhF WF l
0 > + = r r W nF WF ,    0 = = = = = = q q W W W WF WF WF S a S a .
With the same proof of proposition 4, we have
Proposition 4a. In stationary equilibrium z increases but y decreases if a decreases. An
increase in S reduces z and raises y if  1 + < S z z  and yields no effect otherwise. An
increase in n reduces z but raises y if nI remains constant. The effects of l, m, q and r
on y and z are ambiguous.
A significant change due to the introduction of capital costs is that the effect of l
becomes ambiguous. This is because  0 < l W  and  0 > mnhF , and hence the sign of
l WF  is uncertain. If  0 < l WF , then an increase in l still raises z and reduces y. But
when  0 > l WF , the effect is ambiguous and depends on the shape and relative shift of
the WF(z) and V(z) curves.
4.2  Learning-By-Doing
To focus on LBD, assume downstream firms do not engage in any incremental
innovation activities. When they adopt the t-generation new technology invented by an
upstream firm at time  t t , their marginal cost is  t A . From practicing with the new
technology they become more skillful and  their costs decline  automatically with
production according to
) ( ) ( t t t t t A t c - G = . ) , [ 1 + ˛ t t t t t    (1a)
The learning function  ) (t t G  decreases as  t increases with  1 ) 0 ( = Gt  and
t t t G = - G ¥ ﬁ ) ( lim t t t .
20 Although the learning effects are bounded, similar to Young
(1993), the model differs from Young’s in that the learning effects are the result of a
drastic process innovation instead of marginal progress in new product invention. It is
                                               
20 The specification implies that the longer the technology is applied the greater are cumulative learning
effects. An alternative is to assume that learning effects depend on the cumulative output and downstream
firms’ production decisions will take these effects into account.25
plausible to assume learning effects only improve production efficiency marginally so
that  t G  is assumed to be much greater than  1 - t t A A .
Given  1 + t H , the equilibrium investment in drastic innovation  t z  is still
determined by (16b) except that  1 * - t c  in (17) becomes  ) * ( * 1 1 1 - - - - G = t t t t t t A c . Since
the first order condition is the same, proposition 1 still holds and proposition 2 is
simplified such that an increase in expected future investment (a larger  1 + t H ) reduces
current investment (a smaller  t z ).
For stationary equilibrium, the first-order condition is (16c) but  V(z) in (18)
becomes
( ) [ ] { }
) 1 ( 1 1 ) 1 ( ) (
- G - - =
q q l q a H I n z V .  (17b)
An important difference is that V(z) is now a continuously increasing function instead of
being piece-continuous. Propositions 3 and 4a are also applicable to LBD.26
APPENDIX
The Proof of Proposition 1
Arbitrarily choose a positive 
1
t z  and substitute it into (9) to get a series  { }
1
s yt
( ,... 2 , 1 = s ). Calculate 
1
t V  by applying 
1
t z  and  { }
1
s yt  in (17) and substitute it into
rearranged (16) to obtain 
2
t z :
[ ] [ ] r z h m z h r z h z z mh H r V + - + - = + + ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( ) ( 1 t t t t t t t t t t t l l l l l .  (A1)
Use 
2
t z  to obtain  { }
2
s yt  and then 
2
t V  as before. Assume 
2 1
t t z z < , so that 
2 1
s s y y t t >  and
2 1
t t V V < . Noting that the right-hand side of (A1) is an increasing function in  t z ,
substituting 
2
t V  into (A1) yields 
2 3
t t z z > . Repeating this process results in a monotonic
increasing series  { }
k zt  and monotonic decreasing series  { }
k y 1 t ,  { }
k y 2 t , … ( ,... 2 , 1 = k ).
(17)  illustrates that  I n V
k ) 1 ( q t - £ , so that 
k zt  has an upper boundary and lower
boundary zero. On the other hand, 
k
s yt  has an upper boundary 
1
s yt  and lower boundary
zero. Since  { }
k zt ,{ }
k y 1 t ,  { }
k y 2 t ,… are bounded monotonic series, they have limits,  t z ,
1 t y ,  2 t y , …, respectively. These limits are the solution of (9) and (16) and compose the
equilibrium of the model.
If 
2 1
t t z z > ,  { }
k zt  is monotonic decreasing and  { }
k y 1 t ,  { }
k y 2 t ,… are monotonic
increasing. The boundaries for { }
k zt  are zero and 
1
t z . { }
k
s yt  has boundaries zero and  s yt ,
where  s yt  is the solution of (9) when  0 1 = + t H .27
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